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A study of shifts in scientific strategies for measuring 
the living body, especially in dynamic systems 
theory: 1) sheds light on Hegel’s concept of measure 
in The Science of Logic, and the dialectical transition 
from categories of being to categories of essence; 2) 
shows how Hegel’s speculative logic anticipates and 
analyzes key tensions in scientific attempts to 
measure and conceive the dynamic agency of the 
body.  The study’s analysis of the body as having an 
essentially dynamic identity irreducible to 
measurement aims to contribute to reconceiving the 
body, in a way that may be helpful to overcoming 
dualism. 
 
I am writing this sentence on a pad of paper.  
The movement of writing seems integral to 
my thinking, yet the tendency in philosophy 
of mind and science is to barricade the mind 
in the head, to trace it from within by 
reflection, and to identify mindful activity 
with a special, complex part of the body.  In 
the effort to overcome a dualism that 
disembodies mind, we have somehow ended 
up with a mind that lumbers about in an 
otherwise mindless body-machine, we have 
ended up ‘disminding’ the body.  I think that 
it is wrong to ‘dismind’ the body, that 
philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and 
Dewey have shown that mind is inseparable 
from the whole of the moving body in the 
world.1  Yet we still have difficulty thinking 
of the whole moving body as mindful.  
Perhaps we do not see how thinking could 
belong to living movements, parts and 
processes that we find in many organisms 
beside ourselves.  
In part the problem is conceptual, and 
what I want to show is how Hegel’s 
speculative logic can contribute to the 
enormous conceptual task of learning to 
think of the whole moving body as mindful.  
My interlocutor is science, since the 
empirical work of experimentation has 
driven contemporary science to rethink the 
body, for example, to conceive the body as a 
system that dynamically organizes itself, in 
which case mindfulness arises in the whole 
movement of self-organization.  Indeed, 
some scientists conceive this self-organizing 
movement as a cognitive system.2  Yet 
science tends to interpret its results about the 
body within the conceptual framework of 
experimental method, and this framework, 
with its criteria of objectivity and 
repeatability, tends to ‘dismind’ the body 
once again by reducing self-organizing 
systems to a conjunction of laws.3   
This is where Hegel’s speculative 
analysis of the logic of measurement can 
help.  In section one, I show how Hegel’s 
analysis of the demands intrinsic to thinking 
in general can elucidate the explanatory 
demands that configure scientific thinking 
and its appeal to measurement.  In section 
two, this general parallel lets me elucidate a 
pattern of thinking that drives science to 
different strategies of measuring the body, 
which I trace from the work of scientists 
Nikolai Bernstein to Esther Thelen, until 
science eventually encounters a self-
organizing identity that Hegel would call 
measureless.  In section three I show in 
more detail how scientific thinking parallels 
the pattern that Hegel traces in his analysis.  
The approach that I take here, of rethinking 
the body via an analysis of drives internal to 
scientific thinking, is meant to complement  
experiential and phenomenological 
approaches to the body, by showing how 
scientific thinking drives itself past the 
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experimental criteria of objectivity and 
repeatability to an investigative framework 
that includes individuality and history.  In 
the conclusion, I suggest that this framework 
demands that we think of a ‘mindfulness’ 
already at work in the self-organization of 
the body.  Ultimately we need to move 
beyond all conceptual divisions of mind and 
body, to think of a more fundamental, 
unitary phenomenon like Dewey’s body-
mind or Merleau-Ponty’s flesh; but given 
that our tradition still pursues this 
phenomenon in terms of body and mind, 
what is presently required is conceptual 
analysis of those terms, and I here focus on 
body.  
I) Hegel’s Speculative Science, Experimental 
Science and Measure 
Hegel’s Science of Logic provides a 
scientific, speculative analysis of logic, of 
the categorial structures and relationships 
that inhere in thinking anything at all.  By 
saying that the Logic is scientific, I mean 
that it aims to be a Wissenschaft, a 
knowledge endeavour that rigorously and 
exhaustively secures its own principles and 
methods in relation to its object.  To achieve 
this rigour, the Logic moves through a 
dialectic in which thinking examines its 
conception of its object.  Contradictions in 
this conception lead to new insights about 
the object, categories and processes of 
thinking.  The dialectic’s results do not 
depend on simple empirical claims about 
objects or psychological/cognitive claims 
about the faculties of thinking, they have 
validity in virtue of the constraints inherent 
in the very conception of various categories 
of objects.  Hegel will locate these 
constraints in the experienced identity of 
thinking and being.4  When I say that the 
Logic is speculative I mean that its validity 
arises at this conceptual level, and that it 
develops by way of insights demanded by 
the identity of thinking and being.   
Experimental science, hereafter referred 
to simply as “science,” may not be 
concerned with Hegel’s question of how we 
are to think anything at all, and it is not 
constrained by the speculative concept of the 
identity of thinking and being.  But science 
is concerned with explaining things, and to 
do so it thinks of objects in general.  Given 
the demands of explanation, scientific 
thinking and its object mutually constrain 
one another.  As I show below, the demands 
of explanation thereby generate a pattern of 
thinking cognate to the pattern generated by 
the speculative identity of thinking and 
being that Hegel traces in the Logic.  
Let me introduce the parallel through a 
brief reflection on scientific reduction.  To 
reduce biology to chemistry is to find a 
domain of entities possessing greater 
generality than the entities of biology: 
chemical elements promiscuously combine 
to form a multiplicity of different organisms, 
and non-organic beings as well; but living 
beings combine themselves in limited ways 
and only produce limited species of 
organisms.  Chemicals are more basic and 
pervasive entities than living beings, and it 
is because of this that science can aim to 
reduce biology to chemistry and not the 
other way around.  If science is to continue 
reducing one domain to another, it will end 
up having to think about the most general 
and pervasive entity of all, the universe.   
Since the universe as a whole is not an 
object of direct empirical study—it is just 
too big—science’s claims about it will be 
constrained not merely by empirical 
observations but by the universe’s 
conceptual role in explanation.   Scientific 
thinking and its object are here specified by 
mutual constraints emerging from the 
demand of thinking of an object in general 
that will explain all else.  Given this 
constraint, it is inconsistent to think of the 
universe as a static being, for then we would 
have to refer to some determinate 
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phenomenon outside of the universe that 
would explain why the universe starts and 
why it ends up one way or another.  It is 
logically necessary to think of the universe 
as a spontaneous becoming that ‘explains’ 
its content insofar as the universe simply is 
the becoming of all this content.  The 
explanatory demand that constrains science 
entails a pattern of thinking cognate to the 
one traced in the famous initial dialectic of 
being, nothing, and becoming in Hegel’s 
Logic. 
If the becoming of the universe is to 
explain all determinate phenomena then the 
universe must have an underlying, 
continuous unity, otherwise it would not be 
a unified framework of explanation, and this 
continuity must be articulable and 
quantifiable, otherwise it would not be  able 
to explain a multiplicity of phenomena.  But 
if the universe is to explain a multiplicity of 
qualitatively different phenomena, then its 
quantifiable continuity must be united with 
the qualitative determinations that it is to 
explain, and this continuous unity of quality 
and quantity is what we find in variable 
quality.  To conceive variable quality as 
explanatory of a multiplicity of determinate 
things demands quantification through 
measurement, that is, through an activity 
that attends to the way that a quality is itself 
variable.  So the explanatory demand 
inherent in scientific thinking drives it to 
measurement.  The pattern of thinking here 
is cognate to the one Hegel traces when he 
shows that categories of quality and quantity 
logically develop into categories of measure. 
What I have suggested so far is that the 
scientific task of thinking about something 
that would explain everything generates 
conceptual pressures and transitions cognate 
to those that are, according to Hegel, 
intrinsic to the speculative task of thinking 
anything at all.  (We must not, however, 
conflate the two tasks of thinking.)  Securing 
this parallel would require an exposition of 
Hegel’s Logic that cannot be given here, but 
the parallel can be derived by attending to 
the issue of indifference in the Logic and in 
science.5  
If science is driven by the demand to 
explain, then  measurement must be 
conceived as an activity the very concept of 
which is to quantify dimensions of variable 
quality in order to explain the wide variety 
of phenomena that we see around us, rather 
than an activity governed by purely 
technical or empirical demands.  If this is 
the task of measurement, then measurement 
is coherent only if what is measured matters 
to the things we are explaining.  Hegel 
captures this point in the formula that “all 
that exists has a measure,” which means that 
each thing has its own measure.6  We 
therefore need to measure things in a 
manner appropriate to them, and we are left 
wondering what units and dimensions are 
proper to something’s own measure. 
II) Measuring the Body 
Hegel’s analysis of measurement uses 
chemistry as an example.  I discuss the 
body, and argue that there is a parallel 
between the two patterns.  My realization 
that there is a parallel, despite an important 
remark by Hegel (discussed below) which 
suggests that measurement fails when it 
comes to the body, was enabled by John 
Burbidge’s lucid exposition, in Real 
Process: How Logic and Chemistry 
Combine in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature7, 
of the logic of measurement in the case of 
chemistry.  In this section I analyse the 
explanatory demands that drive science 
through a series of strategies for measuring 
the body.  My analysis both draws out the 
logical pattern that Hegel traces in his 
speculative analysis of measurement, and 
illustrates the principles and point of Hegel’s 
analysis.  It thus prepares for the next 
section, in which I return to details of 
Hegel’s analysis to deepen the parallel.  This 
Comment [DM1]:  
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two step procedure tempers the technical 
difficulties of Hegel’s discussion of 
measure.  To facilitate the procedure I 
number important steps in the pattern.  
To begin, measure qua mattering to 
something’s own being is what Hegel will 
call real measure, and I use this term to refer 
to it.8  Every thing has its real measure 
locked up within it, and unlocking this unity 
of quality and quantity will allow science to 
explain the thing within a more general 
framework.  Given its qualitative variability, 
a measurable being can vary relative to 
itself, and this gives us a logical basis for 
establishing a system of measure.  To set up 
a system of measure, we can compare 
something to its own variations, or, better, 
compare it to something of the same variety, 
since it is contradictory to measure 
something by varying its measure.  We can, 
for example, line things up against each 
other to measure their length.  Such external 
comparison brings qualities of something’s 
internal, real measure to the surface.  But 
any directly measurable quality, just in 
virtue of being brought to the surface by an 
external standard, will indifferently apply to 
a multiplicity of beings: once we figure out 
how to make rulers, we can give the length 
of anything, but the length of a thing in and 
of itself tells us almost nothing about that 
thing.9  It is not a real measure in the sense 
discussed above.  This implies a tension, 
since the very point of measurement as a 
strategy of explanation is to have our 
exterior standards actually get at the interior 
structure that matters to the thing.  We need 
explanations and thence measurements that 
matter.  This logical tension drives the 
pattern that emerges below. 
1) To give an example, the length of a leg 
surfaces in external comparisons and is thus 
like any other length, it is superficial and 
abstract.  But the length of the leg is not just 
any length, it is really the length of a leggy, 
voluminous mass.  Now the relation of mass 
to volume through the leg’s length picks out 
its centre of gravity.  This gives something 
closer to a real measure of the leg, since the 
centre of gravity matters to the leg, e.g., it 
constrains leg action and helps explain how 
legs move.  But in the leg itself the centre of 
gravity as such is not differentiated from the 
continuous, living unity of mass and volume 
in the leg.  So we render the centre of 
gravity discrete by locating it through ratios 
of volume, mass and length.  
Logically, any of our attempts to get at 
real measure will have the form suggested 
above.  The only way we can immediately 
quantify a thing’s variable qualities is 
through superficial, external measures.  But 
this tells us almost nothing about the thing 
as a unity of quality and quantity, it 
measures a quantity that is measurable in 
just about everything else—the very 
generality of such basic measurements 
prevents them from explaining the 
determinacy of a thing.  To get at a thing’s 
real measure, to get at a unity of quality and 
quantity that matters to it, we must pit two 
or more of its superficial measures against 
each other and see how they surface in a 
ratio.   
Hegel suggests that this can lead to a sort 
of “derangement” in which reason 
mindlessly throws qualities together in an 
effort to get to the real measure of 
something.  In the organic world the number 
of qualities and relations multiplies, and so 
does the possible derangement.  Further, 
Hegel writes that “The limbs of the animal 
organism have a measure which, as a simple 
quantum, stands in a ratio to the other 
quanta of the limbs; the proportions of the 
human body are the fixed ratio of such 
quanta.  Natural science is still far from 
possessing an insight into the connection 
between such quantities and the organic 
functions on which they wholly depend.”10  
He thus suggests that the natural science of 
his time becomes quite deranged when it 
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tries to link the ratios that surface in the 
human body, which describe its shape and 
structure, to the body’s organic function.  I 
contend, however, that recent achievements 
allow science an insight into this link.  More 
than that, Hegel’s logical-speculative pattern 
elucidates the pressures and transitions 
leading to this insightful link.  
The logical-speculative pattern that leads 
to this insight follows from two conceptual 
constraints: (a) that explaining the body in 
terms of its real measure logically entails 
approaching its measures in terms of ratios 
of external measures, as argued above; (b) 
that what we are trying to explain is the 
living body, not the dead body.  The second 
stipulation is quite important.  One reason 
why the organic science of Hegel’s time 
fails to find the above link is that it lacks 
techniques for measuring the living body—it 
does not measure the body in motion. 
Let us continue with the example of the 
centre of gravity of a limb.  Russian 
physiologist Nikolai Bernstein noted in 1934 
that investigators had tried to locate this 
centre by dissecting frozen cadavers, 
“following which the separate limbs were 
weighed and their centres of gravity 
determined by one of the methods of 
elementary mechanics.”  In Bernstein’s 
ironic words, the above technique begs “the 
most important question of all—to what 
extent the relationships that hold true for 
cadavers are characteristic of live subjects.”  
If we want a real measure, one that matters 
to living movement, it is little use to give a 
measure of a dead body. 
2a) But how is science to overcome this 
problem if, as Bernstein notes, it appears to 
be an “impossible business to weigh a living 
human being, as it were piecemeal”?11  
Bernstein’s solution pits the living body 
against itself by weighing “the [living] 
subject in numerously carefully determined 
controlled positions” on special scales, 
whilst photographing the body.  The 
balancing of the body’s masses against itself 
in a static moment can then be compared 
across different positions of the body, for 
example, lying flat, or having legs pointing 
upward.12  The centre of gravity of a part of 
the body is thereby isolated, by seeing how 
shifting the part shifts the centre of gravity 
of a larger whole.  Rather than measuring 
simple volume/mass ratios of an isolate part, 
which is possible only in the case of dead 
bodies, we are compounding such ratios by 
seeing how they relate across different parts 
of the body, in the series of such compound 
ratios generated when the living body adopts 
various positions.  We are letting the body 
take the lead here—we are getting to the 
variable unity of quantity and quality in the 
body by letting it specify a series of 
measurements that belong to its variability.  
The organizing principle is no longer the 
way we bring external measures to the body, 
but the way the living body organizes these 
measures across its variations. 
2b) Bernstein subsequently compares 
these results across different bodies, which 
allows him to generalize the location of the 
centre of gravity.  Instead of saying the 
centre of gravity is so many centimetres 
down the leg, it can be specified as a 
percentage of the length of any leg.  This 
puts a real measure of the body in terms of 
the body’s own units, ‘percent-of-leg-
length,’ rather than centimetres.  This unit is 
necessary to a real measure of the leg, for it 
means very little to say that the centre of 
gravity of a leg is N centimetres down the 
leg, given that legs grow to very different 
lengths.  It is notable that such tables are 
keyed to body types e.g., male vs. female, so 
the measure is really ‘percent-of-leg-length-
of-a-particular-kind-of-body.’  Esther 
Thelen’s work, discussed below, shows how 
changes in mass distribution within the leg 
as an infant grows explain why the infant’s 
post-natal ability to make stepping 
movements vanishes around six months and 
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reappears later on.  Measures of centre of 
gravity, etc., that are given in terms of 
particular bodies matter to the organic 
function of the body, and help explain it.  
It seems we are getting closer to a real 
measure of the body by seeing how ratios of 
external measures, measured in units of a 
particular body, matter to the body.  But the 
body does not distinguish mass from volume 
and relate them, we do, and in the body 
these ratios exist as immediate unities that 
are inseparably united with other varying 
qualities.  Our measures impose alien 
dimensions on the body, and when we 
measure the way that volume and mass 
intersect in it, we are still being superficial, 
although savvy.  The logical demand of 
getting at the body’s real measures is not 
only to give these measures in the body’s 
own units, but in the body’s own dimension.  
Yet our initial problem remains: we can only 
approach the living body through externally 
measurable dimensions.  So how can we get 
at the living body’s own dimensions, and 
what would such a dimension mean?  
3) The solution lies in pitting the body 
not against itself, but against its own other.  
In pitting the body against itself we 
abstracted it from its own environment to 
see how the dimensions in which we explain 
it matter to it.  If we did not literally freeze 
the body and cut it apart, we immobilized it 
on a scale and moved its parts around; we 
allowed the body to live, but what we 
studied was a body frozen in time by 
photographs.  Controlled laboratory 
conditions precisely limit the body’s relation 
to otherness—we impose the apparatus and 
dimensions of our explanatory thinking on 
the living body and thus finesse it into 
measuring up to our own dead standards.13  
Bernstein is an innovator in getting past this 
problem imposed by the laboratory, since 
his later studies looked into the work of the 
living body.  For example, he used a 
technique similar to cinematography to 
study the body hammering an object, and 
thus observed the body relating to its own 
other, its work and object.  Instead of 
immobilizing the body and measuring static 
moments, he measured smooth variations in 
‘real time.’  In this way he could see how 
the body deals with its world, and for 
reasons suggested above, such a study is 
necessary to reveal dimensions of 
interaction that matter to the body.  Indeed, 
the availability of devices for recording the 
dynamics of living processes seems 
fundamental in enabling science to get past 
the derangement that Hegel observed in the 
organic science of his time. 
4) Bernstein’s studies let him understand 
that the body does have its own internal 
dimensions.  Let me explain what this means 
by describing a recent (1994) series of 
studies of the development of walking 
conducted by the developmental 
psychologist Esther Thelen.  If we measure 
walking within an alien dimensional system, 
we specify it as a series of positions of the 
joints and centres of gravity of the limbs, 
and so on.  The question of how we learn to 
walk then becomes the question of how we 
learn to control our body, such that it moves 
through these positions.  But this explains 
walking in terms alien and indifferent to the 
body and its life.  Thelen’s research is 
informed by dynamic systems theory, which 
has its roots in Prigogine’s theory of chaotic 
systems, and in psychology draws on 
Bernstein’s understanding of bodily 
movement and J.J. Gibson’s ecological 
psychology.  As a dynamic systems theorist, 
she argues that we do not control our bodies 
in terms of alien systems of measurement, 
rather walking arises within the chaotic 
interaction of the body and its environment, 
and is controlled by the ensuing self-
organization of the body as dynamic 
system.14  
She shows this via a study of how the leg 
moves when infants make repeated kicking 
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motions.  Thelen graphed the angle at the 
knee joint against knee velocity, with all the 
data pairs collected over the time of an 
individual infant’s kicking plotted on the 
same graph.  This gives a picture of the leg’s 
position in a space of possible external 
measures over time, which is called a phase 
space.  It turns out that the trajectory of a 
kick graphed in phase space (that is, the 
pattern of relations between the paired 
variables over time) always follows more or 
less the same pattern.  The body has an 
affinity for falling into this pattern; in the 
terminology of dynamic systems theory, 
there is an ‘attractor’ in the phase space, a 
pattern to which the possibilities of the 
system are ‘attracted.’15  
In terms of the leg, the upshot is that the 
leg itself has a certain spring-like propensity 
for making complex kicking motions.  The 
infant’s brain does not manipulate a 
representation of its limb in the alien 
dimensions of science in order to kick, 
which is what some theories would imply.  
When the infant is upright, this same 
propensity shapes the leg’s movement into a 
step. 
In terms of the logic of measure, Thelen’s 
picture of phase space is a snapshot of a 
series of ratios generated by the body’s 
relation to its own other.  The simplicity and 
unity of the pattern that emerges in the series 
determines an internal dimensional system 
of the leg.  In Thelen’s terminology, the 
attractor is an invariant that collapses the 
indefinite complexity of the multi-
dimensional space in which we plot the leg’s 
measures—the space in which scientific 
thinking becomes deranged by conflicting 
qualities—into one simple pattern.  As 
Turvey and Carello put it when discussing a 
cognate result, the body does not measure 
the location of its arm within an external 
dimensional system; rather, moving the arm 
“incurs a time-dependent tissue deformation 
pattern” that is “expressed in the intrinsic 
co-ordinate system defined by the muscles 
and tendons of the forearm.”16 The body is 
intrinsically a living measure and dimension 
of the location of its arms and legs, that is, 
limb location as it matters to the body refers 
to this intrinsic co-ordinate system of the 
body, not to a location in an exterior 
dimensional system.17  
Scientific thinking now seems to have a 
leg up on the body.  The invariant pattern 
and dimensional system revealed in the 
attractor are inseparable from the leg’s own 
dense and massy structure, its own 
dimensions of being.  In this way science 
links organic functions of the leg, stepping 
and kicking, with the leg’s proportions, and 
makes progress past the science of Hegel’s 
time, which, according to Hegel, could not 
find such a link.   
5) But this result means that scientific 
thinking has to give up positing its own 
dimensions for measuring the body, and will 
have to give up measurement in the usual 
sense.  Suppose we construe the attractor as 
collapsing the deranged multiplicity of 
abstract dimensions and ratios of measures 
into one simple pattern.  This conceives the 
internal dimension in terms of our own 
external measures, as if measures in this 
dimension would smoothly vary according 
to some mathematical product of the 
external dimensions that it collapses.  But 
dynamic systems theory argues against this 
conception.  Attractors are discovered in 
phase spaces, and show how science’s 
external measures intersect in the body, as 
the body shapes itself against itself and its 
own other over time.  Attractors thus emerge 
out of the body’s self-shaping, chaotic 
interaction with the environment.  The self-
shaping body in its environment as it were 
enacts attractors, congealing them out of the 
smooth continuum of science’s external 
measures, so scientific thinking can neither 
specify the attractor apart from its 
congealing in the existence of the body, nor 
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conceive the attractor as reductively 
correlated with magnitudes of those external 
measures or their products.   
This is shown by the fact that a change 
that appears to be smooth when specified in 
terms of external measures can lead to an 
abrupt qualitative change in phase space, to 
the enactment of a new attractor.  If you put 
me on a slow moving treadmill and 
gradually turn up the speed, at  certain 
points I will shift from walking to jogging to 
running, and the shifts will be abrupt.  The 
attractors that describe the pendular counter-
rhythms of my legs suddenly shift their 
configuration, since walking, jogging and 
running demand quite different rhythms, as 
we all know.  Attractors, as determining 
internal dimensions of the body, cannot be 
correlated with a calculative product of the 
dimensions that make up their phase space.  
They have their own leaps and bounds that 
are not predictable by any combination of 
ratios of our external measures, since the 
interrelation of measures is intrinsic and 
inseparable from the body’s own being and 
becoming in its environment.  Little is 
explained by making mensural comparisons 
between attractors, for example, by saying 
that walking happens at speed Vw and 
jogging at speed Vj; this may be true, but the 
quantity ΔV= Vw−Vj does not explain much, 
since what is significant about attractors is 
the set of dynamic behaviours that they 
identify, and the values Vw and Vj cannot on 
their own explain those dynamic identities.   
The living body qua embodying such 
attractors is what Hegel calls measureless: 
we cannot bring its transitions into an 
abstract system of measure, the body is 
absolutely indifferent to our system of 
measurement.  
III) The Parallel Between Measuring Bodies 
and Hegel’s Analysis of Chemical 
Measurement 
I contend that what drives the pattern of 
explanatory thinking and strategies of 
measurement traced above is cognate to 
what logically drives the movement from 
measure to the measureless in the Science of 
Logic.  That is, remarkably, the demands 
that pattern the conceptual history of giving 
measures that get better and better at 
capturing the real behaviour of the body, 
from Bernstein through Thelen, are cognate 
to the demands that pattern the ever more 
complex forms of measurement laid out in 
Hegel’s speculative analysis, and the 
patterns are also cognate.  To show this I 
return to the numbered steps in the previous 
section, discussing and identifying them in 
terms of transitions in Hegel’s study of real 
measure in the Logic.  I do this via 
Burbidge’s analysis in Real Process of what 
Hegel has to say about the measurement of 
chemicals.  
1) From specifying measure to ratios of 
measures: The problem that haunts the first 
step is the problem of how we are to specify 
measurements of things, given that basic 
measures and their standards are external to 
what is measured.  E.g., to specify that a 
sample of pure copper has so much mass or 
volume is to say very little about it 
chemically, because a sample of hydrogen 
could have the same mass or volume.  But to 
say that the sample has a certain specific 
gravity, that it is so many times denser or 
less dense than a reference substance, is to 
say a lot about it, because density matters to 
the chemical itself.  This chemical 
measurement strategy, of turning to the 
specific gravity, has its cognate in the 
strategy of measuring the centre of gravity 
of a leg: both measures combine external 
measures.  In the Logic this is the step from 
specifying measure to real measure as a ratio 
Comment [DM2]: Let me return to 
Thelen to show how science has to give 
this up too.  Thelen shows that when the 
infant is upright, the invariant pattern that 
produces a kick is shaped by gravity so as 
to produce a step-like motion.  She argues 
that walking is a kind of interplay 
between the infant and the world, in 
which falling forward pulls the leg back, 
and then muscle firing helps the leg 
spring forward in a stepping motion.  
Above we talked about one leg in 
abstraction from the body, so a question 
that follows is how does a pattern of 
bipedal stepping develop, in which one 
step alternates with an other? In other 
words, how does the real measure of the 
leg belong to the real measure of the 
bipedal body? Thelen noticed that when 
an infant is placed over a treadmill and 
the treadmill drags a leg back, the infant 
can make a stepping motion, even if the 
same infant cannot do this when she is 
held above a surface.  So Thelen set out 
to study infants on treadmills to see how 
bipedal, alternating stepping might arise.  
Amongst many other results, she found 
that alternating stepping was more stable 
at faster, rather than slower, treadmill 
speeds, and alternation as a pattern 
stabilised after the infants was to four to 
five months old.  Thelen’s analysis posits 
alternating stepping as an attractor of the 
behaviour of the infant as a whole, and 
what these results mean is that this 
attractor undergoes a ‘phase change’ 
when certain external variables such as 
treadmill speed or infant age vary. 
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of measures.  (Cf. Real Process 28-33 and 
WdL 388-392/ 348-349.) 
2a) From a ratio of measures, to a 
series of measure relations: Measuring the 
leg’s centre of gravity through simple ratios 
of mass, volume and length would be fine if 
we wanted a real measure of dead, detached 
limbs, but as Bernstein points out we want a 
measure that matters to the leg as part of the 
living body.  The problem here is cognate to 
the chemical problem that a simple measure 
of a chemical’s specific gravity 
underspecifies its chemical identity.  
Specific gravity varies with temperature and 
pressure, different compounds might have 
the same specific gravity, and in any case 
chemicals are not inert.  A real measure 
would capture the identity of the chemical as 
live and reactive. The solution to the 
chemical problem is: (A) to compare the 
specific gravity of a chemical in one 
condition with that of the same chemical in 
other conditions; and (B) to see how the 
chemical’s specific gravity alters when it 
reacts with other chemicals.  This gives a 
profile of the chemical as a reactive agent.  
Even though two chemicals may share 
certain static properties, e.g., specific 
gravity, they could not share all properties 
across a ‘reaction profile,’ else they would 
be the same chemical.  Generating this 
‘reaction profile’ logically entails comparing 
(i) the series of measures obtained when the 
target chemical reacts with a slate of other 
chemicals with (ii) similar series for the 
slate of other chemicals.  The upshot is a 
measure of the chemical within a ‘reaction 
space.’  More bluntly, in the end, 
identification of chemicals through 
measurement is incoherent apart from some 
theoretical framework of measurement like 
the periodic table.  The general logic that 
drives this procedure of measuring from 
simple ratio to a series of ratios is quite 
complex and extends into steps 2b and 3 
below.  It is discussed in WdL 392-396/ 351-
354;  Real Process (pp. 34-40) does an 
admirable job of laying out the complexity 
of the compounding and series involved.   
When Bernstein lets the body generate a 
series of relations between centres of gravity 
across different positions of the living body 
on his special scales, he is doing something 
cognate to step (A) above, but it already 
elides with step (B) in the sense that the 
body is playing the role of an entire 
chemical system.  Putting the body into 
different positions and seeing how the 
centres of gravity combine in new ways is 
akin to combining live chemicals in different 
ways.  
2b) Bernstein’s strategy of comparing 
results across different bodies extends step 
(B).  It is cognate to giving chemical 
measurements in terms of a variability found 
within the system of chemicals, rather than 
proportions of external measures. We are 
measuring bodies in terms of   variability 
that matters to bodies, rather than the 
variability of external measurement systems. 
3) Toward elective affinity: The above 
strategy still has the problem of measuring a 
thing in terms of an external system that is 
conceived merely as a dimension in which 
to measure the thing.  But if the thing can be 
measured in that system, it is because that 
system matters to the thing itself.  To get a 
real measure, we need to see how that 
system matters to the thing itself.  We were 
already getting a sense of this when we saw 
how a chemical reacted with other chemicals 
in its environment, which shows how the 
chemical system matters both to the 
alterability of the chemical and to its identity 
through alteration.  Bernstein’s and Thelen’s 
strategy of studying the movement of the 
living body is cognate: rather than seeing 
how various positions of the living body 
generate a static system for measuring the 
body, studying movement shows how a 
moving system of body positions matters to 
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the living body itself in relation to its 
environment. 
5) From the series of measure relations 
to elective affinity: If the thing’s interaction 
with its environment can matter to the thing, 
it is because the thing interacts with its 
environment in quite specific ways.  We 
notice this when, e.g., we shift our attention 
from the values that we record when looking 
at varying densities in the ‘reaction profile’ 
of a chemical to the pattern of chemical 
reactivity exhibited by this profile.  This 
pattern would in Hegel’s terms specify the 
‘elective affinity’ of a chemical, giving a 
complex picture of how the chemical 
electively combines with other elements.  
The pattern identifies how the chemical 
relates to its ‘reaction space,’ and how that 
‘space’ relates to the chemical.  The strategy 
of plotting bodily measures as co-ordinates 
in a phase space similarly draws a pattern of 
reactivity to our attention, the attractor, 
which gives a complex picture of an 
‘elective’ dynamic within the body, a 
chaotic, self-similar tendency of the body to 
be in certain states in its interaction with its 
environment.  (See Real Process 40-43 and 
WdL 396-410/ 354-366 for more on the 
logical transition between the series of 
measured relations and elective affinities.) 
6) From elective affinity to the nodal 
line and the measureless: Once we are 
looking into elective affinities or attractors, 
the significance of our measures will no 
longer be that of a scale of quantities 
correlated with a scale of qualities specified 
by some mathematical function.  With the 
elective affinity or the attractor we have an 
insight into some ‘knot’ of qualitative 
relations that happen to congeal correlative 
to a fixed point on a scale of quantities, but 
the mere correlation between quality and 
quantity does not explain the phenomenon.  
No quantitative explanation will explain the 
correlation between temperature and the 
freezing point and boiling point of water, 
rather Hegel calls these ‘knots’ or ‘nodal 
points’ along the smooth spectrum of 
temperature.  We have to look into what 
essentially belongs to water, especially at 
these ‘nodal points’  to get some insight to 
the correlation.  And once we are interested 
in that, what really matters is something 
measureless.  (On these transitions, see Real 
Process 44-51,  WdL 410-419/ 366-373.)  
Conclusion: Rethinking the Body 
The above shows that scientific thinking qua 
constrained by the demand of explaining 
things is driven through a conceptual pattern 
cognate to the one that Hegel derives in his 
Science of Logic.  It would be going too far 
to say that the pattern of Hegel’s Logic 
specifies the rich mix of empirical and 
conceptual problems and solutions that 
shape the history of science, or that his  
conception of ‘nodal points,’ the 
measureless, etc., anticipates the concepts of 
dynamic systems theory.  I make a more 
qualified claim.  The mutual constraint of 
thinking and its object govern the procedure 
of both Hegel’s Logic and scientific 
thinking; the former constraint emerges 
from the speculative identity of thinking and 
being, the latter from the demands of 
explanation.  My claim is simply that on a 
large scale the demands of scientific 
explanation impose constraints cognate to 
those of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, and 
that the pattern of thinking that follows, 
namely, the turn from measure to the 
measureless, is cognate to the one Hegel 
derives. 
Recent results in science show that in fact 
science is making such a turn from measure 
to the measureless.  To add an example to 
the ones given above, dynamic systems 
theorists Carello and Turvey show that we 
feel the length of objects like canes by 
feeling how we can use them, and those uses 
“are not simply a function of geometric 
dimensions such as length and width but, in 
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a very real sense, how those objects can be 
moved (e.g., whether or not they are 
‘unwieldy’).”18  Carello and Turvey turn 
from external dimensions such as length and 
width, to ‘dimensions’ such as ‘wieldiness’ 
that could only matter to and within living 
body.   
But in light of my claim, I want to urge a 
bit more.  We should interpret these results 
not merely as empirical data, but as 
indicating that scientific explanation 
inherently demands a turn away from 
measurement, a turn cognate to the one that 
Hegel traces in his Logic.  The very demand 
of giving an explanation of everything in 
general has turned into the demand of 
comprehending essential identities that 
cannot be reduced to an “everything in 
general,” because the beings that we want to 
explain are self-organizing, they exist by 
forging themselves within the universe as a 
whole qua basis of explanation.  We need to 
comprehend how such beings explain 
themselves through what essentially matters 
to their existence as self-organizing—we 
explain them by comprehending how they 
organize themselves, not by reducing them 
to external dimensions. 
This means that the explanation of self-
organizing things is, so to speak, packed into 
their dynamic of self-organization.  So we 
must explain such things through their own 
history, rather than through some neutral 
dimension prior to their own history.  In her 
recent book, Dynamics in Action, Alicia 
Juarrero insists that dynamic systems be 
understood as historical and containing their 
own history, e.g., she writes, citing 
Prigogine, that “complex systems do not 
forget their initial conditions: they ‘carry 
their history on their backs.’  Their origin 
constrains their trajectory.” 19  To put it 
another way, we have, in effect, had to wait 
for self-organizing things to come into being 
so that we may study them.  We therefore 
cannot explain them in terms of abstract 
dimensions that we isolate in the present.  
We must study what we have waited for, 
and this includes their own time of 
becoming, in which they create the 
dimensions in which we study them, a 
strangely Bergsonian principle in this 
context.   
In the case of human beings, this 
becoming is individual, and as Thelen and 
Smith argue, “the individual and his or her 
behavioural changes over time are the 
fundamental unit of study.”20 We will have 
to study social, cultural and individual 
history, a point taken to heart by Thelen, 
Smith and Fogel, amongst others who 
observe that the dynamics of individual 
human bodies, even of such seemingly 
mindless and mechanical actions such as 
reaching, depend on development in a social 
milieu.21    
This is where the challenge to 
‘disminding’ the body arises.  A body whose 
terms of explanation are packed into its own 
history is ‘mindful’ at least so far as its own 
process ‘authorizes’ the terms we bring to its 
explanation.  This complex conceptual point 
shows itself empirically if we note, as do 
Fogel, Thelen and Smith, that the essential 
identity of the self-organizing body arises 
through its mutual implication in other 
bodies.  This mutual implication is 
fundamentally social, communicative and 
expressive—and sociality, communication 
and expression are mindful activity.  The 
body that we tried to explain through an 
appeal to the underlying continuity of the 
universe and its measurable dimensions of 
matter instead has its identity only within an 
historical sphere of social identities, and this 
sphere is mindful.  The reductive move, of 
explaining all the terms of this sphere via a 
‘disminded’ explanatory substratum, is 
blocked by the very demands of explanation, 
because the mindfulness of the social-
historical sphere becomes integral with the 
very body being explained.   
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Dynamic systems theory discovers that 
the reductive move is empirically 
problematic.  What I have tried to urge by 
drawing a parallel between the pattern of 
Hegel’s Logic and the pattern of scientific 
thinking is that in the end the reductive 
move is conceptually problematic.  The 
block to reduction, I want to suggest, is 
conceptually inherent in the very matter of 
explanation, and calls for a reconception of 
the framework of explanation.  Body and 
mind cannot be isolated as two terms that 
can be reduced to one, from the start our 
fundamental conceptual unit must be body-
mind as self-organizing individual integrated 
with its history.  We cannot aim to reduce 
mind to a neural substratum in the biological 
body because we comprehend that the very 
thing that drives our question, a being that 
organizes itself as a mindful-body to be 
explained, exists only if it grows up as an 
individual in a society that is already 
mindful and that enables the scientific 
community in which we study one another’s 
minds.  And if we wish to appeal to some 
prior sphere to explain how society and 
individuals came about such that they enable 
mindful self-organization, if, in other words, 
we wish to give an account of the genesis of 
this sphere, then here too we will have to see 
that the crucial transitions are self-
organizing and mindful.   
Does this mean an end to scientific 
thinking about the body?  Do we have to 
start explaining body and mind by appealing 
to some mysterious mental substance?  I do 
not think so.  Rather, we have to rethink 
what counts as an explanation and what 
counts as nature.  Reductive explanation 
seeks to explain things in terms of a nature 
that is logically independent of what is being 
explained.  But if the things that we wish to 
explain, like the body, forge themselves 
within nature, then nature is not independent 
of what we wish to explain.  We can give 
explanations of mind and body as natural 
phenomena, but the nature in question will 
no longer be the same, it will be a nature in 
which individuality and history are inherent.  
Learning to think of nature in this way, and 
of body-mind in terms of this nature, will be 
an extremely difficult conceptual task, and 
this paper makes only the slightest 
contribution to this task, at the broadest 
conceptual scale.  Perhaps an extension of 
Hegel’s speculative Science of Logic in the 
direction I have taken so far will help with 
this task, and I suspect that a study of the 
“Doctrine of the Concept” in that book will 
be requisite to such an extension.  In any 
case—and here I echo Renaud Barbaras’s 
conclusion and sentiment in “The 
Movement of the Living as the Originary 
Foundation of Perceptual Intentionality”22—
rethinking the body so as to give an account 
of the unity of mind and body will entail 
rethinking nature.23
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